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Preserving Privacy of Finite Impulse Response Systems
Giulio Bottegal, Farhad Farokhi, and Iman Shames
Abstract—Adding input and output noises for increasing
model identification error of finite impulse response (FIR)
systems is considered. This is motivated by the desire to protect
the model of the system as a trade secret by rendering model
identification techniques ineffective. Optimal filters for con-
structing additive noises that maximizes the identification error
subject to maintaining the closed-loop performance degradation
below a limit are constructed. Furthermore, differential privacy
is used for designing output noises that preserve the privacy of
the model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Innovative industries invest resources (e.g., money and
time for research and development) to construct new systems
and to improve the performance of the previously-deployed
ones. To generate revenue and offset the cost of research,
they ideally want to capitalize on their achievements. This is
sometimes done by restricting the use of their ideas through
patents or by hiding the features of their systems as trade
secrets. When opting for trade secrets, reverse engineering
techniques can be used by competitors to unravel their se-
crets. For instance, model identification tools can be utilized
to identify a black-box system or to extract the parameters
of a gray-box system. The gained information can be then
used to reverse the financial gains. This motivates the use
of methods that can render reverse-engineering techniques
ineffective. Such methods, however, most often degrade the
performance of the system. Therefore, a framework for
balancing the need for preserving the trade secrets against
maintaining the performance of the systems is required.
In this paper, linear time-invariant discrete-time finite im-
pulse response (FIR) system are considered. Specifically, the
idea of adding noises to the input and output for increasing
the error of model identification is explored. A bound on
closed-loop performance degradation caused by the additive
noise is enforced. An optimal filter for constructing the addi-
tive input and output noises that maximizes the identification
error subject to maintaining the performance degradation
below a threshold is constructed. This is done for both
known and unknown input sequences. The former is useful
to make the identification difficult for given inputs, such as
the optimal experimental design in the model identification
literature [1]. The latter, which requires statistics of the
input, can accommodate the belief of the designer on the
reverse engineering techniques, e.g., a frequently used input
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for model identification purposes is a sequence of i.i.d.1
Gaussian noise [2]. Finally, differential privacy framework
is used for designing output additive noises that make the
system identification difficult without any assumptions on
the utilized inputs.
In differential privacy literature, noises are added to the
outcome of statistical queries from databases to preserve the
privacy of individuals in the database [3]. This framework
was more recently used in dynamical systems [4], [5]. In
differential privacy literature, most often, additive Laplace
noises are used and the parameters of the noise are selected
according to the sensitivity of the outcome to variations in the
data (that should be kept private). However, weaker variants
of differential privacy can be achieved by additive Gaussian
noises. This is advantageous as adding Laplace noise can
make the designer’s task considerably more difficult (in terms
of utilizing the outputs of the system), e.g., optimal state
estimation when measurements are corrupted by Laplace
noise results in non-linearities and memory issues [6].
To the best of our knowledge, the differential privacy has
not been explored in the context of preserving the privacy of
dynamical systems with the aim of protecting the model as a
trade secret. This has been explored thoroughly in one of the
sections of the paper. In addition, in this paper, the problem
of preserving the privacy of the systems is cast as a concrete
optimization problem that balances the need for keeping the
privacy with that of the maintaining the performance. This
provides a different approach to that of differential privacy in
which constraints on the performance degradation cannot be
enforced directly to optimally balance between privacy and
performance. Finally, note that the problem of releasing the
dynamical model of a system under privacy constraints was
considered in [7]. In this paper, we take a different approach,
i.e., we do not release the model of the system. We want
to ensure that inferring an exact model relating inputs and
outputs is made difficult.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The design
of optimal additive input and output noise to hinder system
identification is studied in Section II. Section III uses the
differential privacy for constructing additive output noises.
A numerical example is provided in Section IV. Some
concluding remarks are presented in Section V.
II. OPTIMAL ADDITIVE NOISE
Here, we investigate the use of additive noise to preserve
the privacy of the model information assuming that the
eavesdropper uses the best linear unbiased estimate. These
1i.i.d. stands for independently and identically distributed.
results are subsequently generalized (to the case where the
model of the eavesdropper is not known) when using the
differential privacy framework.
A. Problem Formulation
In this paper, for sake of simplicity of presentation, lin-
ear single-input single-output (SISO) time-invariant discrete-
time systems are considered. All the derivations can be
extended to multi-input multi-output (MIMO) systems. The
system is described by the following equation
yt = H(q
−1)rt + et, (1)
where H(q−1) represents the transfer function of the system,
which is driven by the reference input rt. The output yt is
corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise with variance
σ2, which is represented by et. Assume that H(q
−1) can be
well-represented by a finite-impulse response (FIR) system
of order nh, i.e., H(q
−1) =
∑nh−1
k=0 hkq
−k. Hence, the
dynamics of the system is completely characterized by the
vector of coefficients h := [h0 . . . hnh−1]
⊤. In this paper,
we assume null initial conditions (that is rt = 0 for t ≤ 0),
though extension to any initial condition is straightforward
due to the linearity of the underlying system.
Assume that an adversary is interested in inferring on the
process relating rt to yt by attempting to estimate h from
a set of N input/output measurements {rt, yt}Nt=1. To com-
plicate the identification process, an additional component
(which is not accessible to the adversary) can be added
to the input or to the output of the system to lower the
identification accuracy. Let wt capture such an additional
component, which changes the model of the system as
yt = H(q
−1)rt + et + wt. (2)
This term can capture both the additive input and output
noise as discussed, in detail, in what follows.
Assumption 2.1: The malicious entity is unaware of the
presence of the additive input or output noise.
This assumption is rather conservative. When using the
differential privacy framework in the next section, we can
avoid such assumptions. Considering a FIR model for the
system and in light of Assumption 2.1, the best linear unbi-
ased estimate (BLUE) of h from perspective of the malicious
entity is given by the standard least-squares estimate [8,
Ch. 4]. Let us introduce the vectors y := [y1 . . . yN ]
⊤,
e := [e1 . . . eN ]
⊤, and w := [w1 . . . wN ]
⊤. Assuming that
the system is at rest prior to the data collection (i.e., rt = 0
for all t ≤ 0) and defining the matrix
R :=


r1 0 0 . . . 0
r2 r1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
rnh rnh−1 rnh−2 . . . r1
...
...
...
. . .
...
rN rN−1 . . . . . . rN−nh+1


,
it is evident that y = Rh+w+e. The least-squares estimate
of h is then given by
hˆ = (R⊤R)−1R⊤y. (3)
Note that this estimator is not the true BLUE, which would
require the knowledge of the second order statistics of wt.
However, it is the best that the malicious entity can do
without the knowledge that wt exists. This estimator is still
unbiased because E{hˆ} = E{(R⊤R)−1R⊤(Rh+w+ e)} =
h + (R⊤R)−1R⊤E{w + e} = h. Then, a measure of the
accuracy of the estimation of the impulse response is the
covariance matrix of hˆ [8, Ch. 4], namely
Ph := E{(hˆ− h)(hˆ− h)⊤}. (4)
The additional input wt determines the quality of the esti-
mated system hˆ by entering into the expression of the param-
eter covariance matrix Ph. Intuitively, the higher the power
of wt, the higher Ph (and thus the lower the identification
accuracy). On the other hand, wt has an undesired effect on
the output power. Therefore, the additive noise is designed
to increase the total variance of hˆ (expressed through the
trace of Ph) while keeping low the contribution of wt to
the variance of yt. Let λy := E
[
y2t |rt = 0, t ∈ Z
]
be such
contribution. Note that, if rt = 0, the output is driven only
by the stationary noise processes et and wt and so λy is
constant in t.
Problem 2.2: For a given input r, find an appropriate
additive noise wt to maximize the identification error tr(Ph)
while keeping the performance degradation small by guar-
anteeing λy ≤ γ1.
In Problem 2.2, γ1 is a pre-selected constant that reflects
the maximum tolerable output variance, which is a measure
of the performance degradation caused by the additive input
and output noises. If γ1 is very small, the optimal solution
is add no noise. In this case, the closed-loop performance is
far superior to protecting the model. However, if γ1 is too
large, the output of the system is drowned in noise and thus
the system becomes practically useless.
Here, the additive noise is designed for a given sequence
of inputs captured by r. This might not be generally feasible
as, when dealing with causal systems, the additive noise
should be designed and employed prior to receiving the entire
sequence of inputs. This design methodology is however very
useful to make the identification difficult for a given input,
such as those in optimal experimental design in the model
identification literature [1]. Alternatively, a distribution for
the input signal can be considered. Furthermore, the length
of the experiment N that the malicious entity is collecting
to identify the system is also unknown a priori, and shall be
treated as a random quantity.
Assumption 2.3: Let N ∈ N be a random number dis-
tributed according to P{N = ℓ} = p(ℓ) for some p : N →
[0, 1] such that
∑
ℓ∈N p(ℓ) = 1. For a given N , assume
that r ∈ RN is distributed according to the conditional
probability density function p(·|N) such that P{r ∈ R|N} =∫
r′∈R
p(r′|N)dr′ for all Lebesgue-measurable setsR ⊆ RN .
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Fig. 1. The schematic diagram of the closed-loop system with additive
output (a) and input (b) noises. The eavesdropper only has access to the
signals outside of the dashed box.
Remark 2.4: In general, the probability density function
of the input signals might not be known in advance. In
that case, an online or adaptive approach can be used to
estimate the statistical properties of the input as more inputs
are revealed over time and design (or update the design of)
privacy-preserving filters based on the additional gathered
information. The result of this paper can serve as a first step
in that direction. This is because if rigorous treatment of the
problem for known deterministic inputs or random inputs
with known probability distributions is not well understood,
the analysis of the online approach would not be possible
(or straightforward to say the least).
In this case, the identification error Ph which is used as
a measure of privacy should be replaced with E{Ph} with
the expectation being taken over random variables r and N .
This allows us to generalize the problem of the interest as
follows.
Problem 2.5: For given distributions of random variables
N and r following Assumption 2.3, find an appropriate addi-
tive noise wt to maximize the identification error tr(E{Ph})
while keeping the performance degradation small by guar-
anteeing λy ≤ γ1.
In this paper, two families of additive noise are considered,
namely, additive output noise and additive input noise. In the
remainder of this section, these two families are described.
1) Additive Output Noise: Figure 1 (a) illustrates the
schematic diagram of the closed-loop system with additive
output noise. The additive noise wt is modelled by a zero-
mean moving-average (MA) stochastic process of the form
wt = L(q
−1)vt, (5)
where vt is a sequence of i.i.d. zero-mean noise (which is
not necessarily Gaussian) of unit variance and L(q−1) :=∑nl
k=0 lkq
−k is a FIR filter of prescribed order nl. Then,
wt is a stationary process with zero-mean and well-defined
autocovariance function [9]. The additive noise w :=
[w1 . . . wN ]
⊤ can be expressed as w = Lv, where v :=
[v−nl+2 . . . v0 v1 . . . vN ]
⊤ and
L :=


lnl−1 . . . l0 0 0 . . . 0
0 lnl−1 . . . l0 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 lnl−1 . . . l0 0
0 0 . . . 0 lnl−1 . . . l0

 . (6)
The identification error covariance, in this case, is
Ph = (R
⊤R)−1R⊤Var[w + e]R(R⊤R)−1
= (R⊤R)−1R⊤(LL⊤ + σ2IN )R(R
⊤R)−1. (7)
Further, the output variance can be determined by
λy := E{y2t |rt = 0} = E{(wt + et)2} = ‖l‖2 + σ2, (8)
where l = [l0 . . . lnl−1]
⊤.
Remark 2.6: It should be noted that by increasing the
order of the noise generation filter nl, the performance
can only be improved while maintaining the same privacy
guarantee. This is because the optimal solution from the
lower order is always feasible in the optimization problem
relating to the higher order noise filters. The order of the
system is thus only dictated by the available resources for
preserving the privacy of the model.
2) Additive Input Noise: Figure 1 (b) shows the schematic
diagram of the closed-loop system with additive input noise.
In this case, the additive input noise is denoted by xt and is
modeled by a zero-mean MA stochastic process of the form
xt = L(q
−1)vt, (9)
where, similarly, vt is a sequence of i.i.d. zero-mean noise of
unit variance and L(q−1) is a FIR filter of prescribed order nl
determining the autocorrelation of xt. Then, the new system
is described by
yt = H(q
−1)(rt + xt) + et
= H(q−1)(rt + L(q
−1)vt) + et. (10)
The additive noise wt, in this case, is the contribution of xt
to the output, i.e., wt = H(q
−1)L(q−1)vt. Define
F (q−1) := H(q−1)L(q−1), (11)
which can be expressed as
F (q−1) =
nf−1∑
k=0
fkq
−k, nf=nh+nl−1. (12)
Note that x:=[x1 . . . xN ]
⊤ can be expressed as x=Fv with
v := [v−nf+2 . . . v0v1 . . . vN ]
⊤ and F is defined similarly
to L in (6). The identification error covariance becomes
Ph = (R
⊤R)−1R⊤Var[w + e]R(R⊤R)−1
= (R⊤R)−1R⊤(FF⊤ + σ2IN )R(R
⊤R)−1. (13)
Finally, it can be shown that λy = ‖f‖2 + σ2, where f =
[f0 . . . fnf−1]
⊤.
B. Deterministic Input
This part is dedicated to solving Problem 2.2. The results
are first presented for the output noise case.
1) Additive Output Noise: For additive output noise, Prob-
lem 2.2 can be rewritten as
argmaxl∈Rnl tr(Ph), (14a)
s.t. λy ≤ γ1, (14b)
where γ1 denotes the maximum tolerated output variance.
Define the performance degradation ratio
ρ :=
E{y2t |rt = 0}
E{y2t |rt = 0, wt = 0}
=
λy
σ2
.
If the goal of the designer is to keep the performance
degradation ratio below ǫ, the constant γ1 can be selected
to be smaller than σ2ǫ. The following lemma is instrumental
to obtain an analytic solution of (14).
Lemma 2.7: Let
E := R(R⊤R)−1(R⊤R)−1R⊤ , (15a)
c := tr(σ2(R⊤R)−1) , (15b)
and denote by Ql a selection matrix such that vec(L) = Qll,
where vec(L) is a vector composed of all the columns of
the matrix L. Then, for the additive noise model, tr(Ph) =
l⊤Q⊤l (IN+nl−1 ⊗ E)Qll + c.
Proof: See Appendix A,
Defining M := Q⊤l (IN+nl−1 ⊗E)Ql and noting that the
term c is independent of l (and thus can be discarded from
the optimization problem), we transform (14) into
argmaxl∈Rnl l
⊤Ml (16a)
s.t. l⊤l ≤ γ1 − σ2. (16b)
The following result can be immediately proved.
Theorem 2.8: The solution of (16) is l∗ =
√
γ1 − σ2η∗,
where η∗ is the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of M .
Proof: The change of variable η = l/
√
γ1 − σ2
transforms the optimization problem in (16) to
η∗ ∈ argmaxη∈Rnl η⊤Mη
s.t. η⊤η ≤ 1.
Note that M ≥ 0 has at least one positive eigenvalue
(as otherwise M = 0). Therefore, Courant–Fischer–Weyl
min-max principle [10, p. 58] shows η∗ is the normalized
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of M .
It can be seen that the quality of the model identification
drops linearly with increasing γ1. At the same time, the
performance degradation ratio increases linearly with γ1.
This capture the trade-off between these two objectives. Note
that, for instance, simply increasing the noise variance σ2 to
the upper bound γ1 would determine a linear increase of the
identification error, as Ph is proportional to σ
2. However,
this strategy is non-optimal, and Theorem 2.8 shows how to
obtain the best trade-off between performance degradation
and model quality degradation, namely how to get highest
linear gain. A comparison between these two strategies is
given in Section IV.
If, for a given application, the linear dependency between
model quality degradation and system performance degra-
dation is not suitable, one can use the following alternative
formulation of the problem:
argminl∈Rnl (tr(Ph))
−1
+ γ2λy , (17)
where γ2 determines weight on the performance versus the
privacy. This formulation is useful when the constraint on
the performance is not hard (i.e., the degradation does not
need to be maintained under a given level but large output
variations are not pleasant). This problem is rewritten as
argminl∈Rnl (l
⊤Ml + c)−1 + γ2‖l‖2 , (18)
where c is defined in (15).
Theorem 2.9: Let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λnl ≥ 0 be the eigen-
values of M and v1, v2, . . . , vnl denote the corresponding
eigenvectors. The solution of (18) is
l∗ =
{
0, λ1 ≤ γ2c2,√
1/
√
γλ1 − c/λ1v1, otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix B.
2) Additive Input Noise: Similarly, Problem 2.2 can be
expressed as
argmaxl∈Rnl tr(Ph), (19a)
s.t. λy ≤ γ1. (19b)
Using the same line of reasoning as in Lemma 2.7, we
introduce the following instrumental result.
Lemma 2.10: Let Qf be a selection matrix such that
vec(F ) = Qff . Then, for the additive input noise model,
tr(Ph) = f
⊤Q⊤f (IN+nf−1 ⊗ E)Qff + c , (20)
where E and c are defined in (15).
Proof: The proof follows the same line of reasoning as
in Lemma 2.7.
Now, note that the coefficients of the filter L(q−1) and
filter F (q−1) = H(q−1)L(q−1) are related according to
f = Hl, (21)
where H ∈ Rnf×nl is a Toeplitz matrix formed by the
coefficients of h. Substituting (21) in (20) gives tr(Ph) =
l⊤H⊤Q⊤f (IN+nf−1⊗E)QfHl+c. Therefore, the optimiza-
tion problem in (19) can be transformed into
argmaxl∈Rnl l
⊤M ′l, (22a)
s.t. l⊤H⊤Hl ≤ γ1 − σ2, (22b)
where M ′ = H⊤Q⊤f (IN+nf−1 ⊗ E)QfH . The following
result can be immediately proved.
Theorem 2.11: Assume H⊤H > 0. The solution of (22)
is l∗ =
√
γ1 − σ2(H⊤H)1/2η∗, where η∗ is the normal-
ized eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of
(H⊤H)−1/2M ′(H⊤H)−1/2.
Proof: Introducing η = (H⊤H)−1/2l/
√
γ1 − σ2 trans-
forms the optimization problem in (16) to
η∗ ∈ argmaxη∈Rnl η⊤(H⊤H)−1/2M ′(H⊤H)−1/2η
s.t. η⊤η ≤ 1.
The rest of the proof follows the same line of reasoning as
in the proof of Theorem 2.8.
The condition H⊤H > 0 is satisfied so long as H has full
column rank. This is guaranteed if hnh 6= 0, i.e., no fewer
than nh parameters are required for describing filter H(q
−1).
Remark 2.12: The derivations of this section hold for
arbitrary noise distributions as only the first and the second
moments of the noise were considered. However, the choice
of the Gaussian noise is highly preferred as it makes the
integration of the closed-loop system with other control loops
much easier. This is an important feature as, most often,
off-the-shelf systems are interconnected to achieve complex
tasks. Other noise distributions do not lend themselves that
easily to integration as they might violate assumptions in the
design of the control loops (e.g., Laplace noise results in an
increased false alarm rate for fault detection schemes).
C. Extension to regularized least-squares
We now modify the proposed privacy-preserving technique
to cope with regularized least-squares estimators. The cost
function associated with this type of estimators is
JRLS(h) = ‖y −Rh‖22 + η‖h‖2K−1 , (23)
where K is a positive semidefinite matrix (usually called
a kernel) inducing desired properties in the estimates hˆ,
see [11] for details on regularized methods for system
identification. The solution to (23) is
hˆ = (R⊤R+ ηK−1)−1R⊤y = Cy , (24)
with obvious defintion of C. This solution is biased. Further,
it can be verified (see, e.g., [11]) that the mean square error
(MSE) of the estimate is given by
MSE =E{(h− hˆ)(h− hˆ)⊤} (25)
=(Inh − CR)hh⊤(Inh − CR)⊤
+ CLL⊤C⊤ + σ2CC⊤,
the first term on the right hand side corresponding to the
bias induced by the regularization penalty. Then, the results
of Theorems 2.8 and 2.9 hold by redefining
E := C⊤C , (26a)
c := tr((Inh − CR)hh⊤(Inh − CR)⊤ + σ2CC⊤) , (26b)
and, accordingly, updating the definition of matrix M . Note
that the identification performance depends on the parameter
η, regulating the bias-variance trade off, and on the kernel
matrixK . These are user choices, which are not accessible to
privacy-preserving device. One possible way to circumvent
this issue is to consider the best possible choice of kernel,
which is given by K = hh⊤ [11].
D. Random Inputs
The problem of designing an additive output noise is only
considered in this section. The results can be easily extended
to the design of input noises following the same line of
reasoning. Problem 2.5 can be cast as
argmaxl∈Rnl tr(E{Ph}) (27a)
s.t. λy ≤ γ1. (27b)
Note that tr(Ph) = E{c(r,N)}+ l⊤E{Ql(N)⊤(IN+nf−1 ⊗
E(r,N))Ql(N)}l. Although having the same definition,
Ql(N), E(r,N), c(r,N) are used instead of Ql, E, and c
to emphasize they are functions of random variables N and
r. Define M ′′ := E{Ql(N)⊤(IN+nf−1 ⊗ E(r,N))Ql(N)}.
The optimization problem in (27) can be rewritten as
argmaxl∈Rnl l
⊤M ′′l, (28a)
s.t. l⊤l ≤ γ1 − σ2. (28b)
Theorem 2.13: The solution of (28) is l∗ =
√
γ1 − σ2η∗,
where η∗ is the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of M ′′.
Proof: The proof follows the same line of reasoning as
in Theorem 2.8.
Unfortunately, calculating M ′′ in an explicit from as a
function of the distributions of N and r is generally difficult.
The following remark provides a numerical algorithm for
constructing an approximation of this matrix.
Remark 2.14 (Monte Carlo Simulation): Samples of pos-
sible input length N i, i ∈ {1, . . . , θ}, are selected ran-
domly. For each N i, ϑ samples of the inputs of length
N i can be selected. Let these samples be denoted by rij .
Define Mˆ ′′ = (1/(θϑ))
∑θ
i=1
∑ϑ
j=1Ql(N
i)⊤(INi+nf−1 ⊗
E(rij , N i))Ql(N
i). Evidently, P{‖Mˆ ′′ −M ′′‖ ≥ ǫ} → 0
as both θ and ϑ tend to infinity for all ǫ > 0. Therefore, by
selecting enough samples, an arbitrarily close approximation
of M ′′ with a high probability can be constructed.
III. RELATIONSHIP TO DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Throughout this section, the design of an additive output
noise is only considered. The results for the additive input
noise can be constructed similarly. Furthermore, h is assumed
to belong to a compact set H ⊆ Rnh .
Definition 3.1: The system is ǫ-differential private if
P{y ∈ Y|h} ≤ exp(ǫ)P{y ∈ Y|h′} for all Lebesgue-
measurable sets Y ⊆ R and h, h′ ∈ H that differ in at most
only one entry, i.e., ‖h − h′‖0 ≤ 1. The system is (ǫ, δ)-
differential private if P{y ∈ Y|h} ≤ exp(ǫ)P{y ∈ Y|h′}+δ.
Note that a random variable w is said to follow the Laplace
distribution with mean µ and (scaling) parameter b > 0
if P{w ∈ W} = ∫w∈W(2b)−1 exp(−|w − µ|/b)dw for all
Lebesgue-measurable sets W ⊆ R.
Theorem 3.2: Assume wt is i.i.d. Laplace random vari-
ables with b ≥ suph,h′∈H:‖h−h′‖0≤1 ‖Rh− Rh′‖1/ǫ. Then,
the system is ǫ-differential private.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Note that suph,h′∈H:‖h−h′‖0≤1 ‖Rh−Rh′‖1 exists and is
finite because H is assumed to be a compact set.
Theorem 3.3: Assume wt is i.i.d. Laplace random vari-
ables with scaling parameter b. Then, λy = 2b
2 + σ2.
Proof: The proof follows from that λy := E{y2t |rt =
0} = E{w2t }+ E{e2t} = 2b2 + σ2.
Combination of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 illustrates the trade-
off between preserving privacy and closed-loop performance
because as ǫ tends to zero (to achieve a higher level of
privacy), the performance degrades (i.e., λy goes to infinity).
Proposition 3.4: Let H := {h ∈ Rnh |h ≤ hi ≤ h, ∀i}.
Then, suph,h′∈H:‖h−h′‖0≤1 ‖Rh−Rh′‖1=(h−h)
∑N
k=1 |rk|.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Proposition 3.4 illustrates that the parameter of the Laplace
noise b should be increased upon admitting larger input
sequences. This is because, with larger N , there are more
data to extract the system parameters and, thus, the employed
mechanism needs to be more conservative to avoid leaking
the private information. Some relaxations of the differential
privacy, e.g., (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, that lend themselves
to using a Gaussian noise, e.g., [4]. Let for any ǫ and δ define
κ(ǫ, δ) = (Q−1(δ)+
√
Q−1(δ)2 + 2ǫ)/2 with Q−1 denoting
the inverse of Q : x 7→ ∫∞x 1/√2π exp(−u2/2)du.
Theorem 3.5: Assume wt is i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian
noise with σ ≥ κ(ǫ, δ) suph,h′∈H:‖h−h′‖0≤1 ‖Rh−Rh′‖2/ǫ.
Then, the system is (ǫ, δ)-differential private.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.2 and
can be found in [4].
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Consider the discrete-time system yt = G(q
−1)rt + et,
where G(q−1) = (q−1 − 0.2q−2)/(1 − 0.9q−1 + 0.17q−2).
Clearly, G(q−1) is not a FIR system. This system can be
approximated by the FIR filter H(q−1) = q−1 + 0.7q−2 +
0.46q−3+0.295q−4+0.1873q−5+0.1184q−6+0.0747q−7+
0.0471q−8+0.0297q−9. The quality of the approximation is
‖H(q−1)−G(q−1)‖ = 0.0507. In the following, we consider
the deterministic input and the random input cases.
1) Deterministic inputs: We assume that a sequence of
N = 200 input samples is injected by the malicious entity.
The sequence is generated by filtering a white noise process
through the low-pass filter W (q−1) = 1/(1− 0.95q−1). We
set σ2 = 1 and γ1 = 2, so that we are allow to double the
variance of the output. First, we consider the least-squares
estimator (3). We compute the identification error, given by
tr(Ph), of least-squares equipped with the proposed privacy
preserving technique using output additive noise case with
nl = 10, and the identification error of least-squares without
any privacy preserving device. To get a fair comparison, in
the latter case the noise variance is equal to the total noise
variance of the former case, that is tr(FF ′)/N + σ2. The
noise filter designed by the privacy preserving device yields
tr(Ph) = 0.25, while the variance obtained using standard
least-squares is tr(Ph) = 0.17; we have thus obtained an
error increase of approximately 50%.
We now consider regularized least-squares estimators, as
described in Subsection II-C. We employ as regularization
kernel the stable spline kernel Ki,j = β
max(i,j) (see [11]),
with β = 0.7. The trade off parameter η is set as η =
0.1. Using the proposed privacy preserving technique the
obtained MSE of the estimated system is 0.17, while without
privacy preservation (and with the same noise variance) we
get a MSE equal to 0.13. Increasing η, the privacy preserving
device tends to have a milder effect on the MSE, because
the regularized least-squares estimator gives higher weight
to the prior knowledge, penalizing the information acquired
from data.
2) Random inputs: Assume that the malicious entity in-
jects a sequence of i.i.d. zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian
variables of length N chosen with equal probability from
{10, . . . , 20}. The approach of Subsection II-D is considered
for constructing an optimal additive output noise with nl = 5.
In this example, M ′′ is approximated using the method of
Remark 2.14 with θ = 100 and ϑ = 1000. Set σ2 = 0.1 and
γ1 = 0.2. Therefore, the performance degradation ratio is
upper-bounded as ρ ≤ 2 (indeed the upper bound is tight due
to the nature of the optimal solution). The optimal additive
input noise, in this case, is driven by the FIR filter L(q−1) =
0.1450+0.0799q−1+0.2125q−2+0.0799q−3+0.1450q−4.
Using the Monte Carlo simulation, it can be shown that
tr(E{Ph})/tr(E{Ph|wt = 0}) ≈ 1.9639. Therefore, the
system identification error has been approximately doubled
at the expense of doubling the output variance. From The-
orem 2.13, it can be inferred that tr(E{Ph})/tr(E{Ph|wt =
0}) = 1 + (η∗⊤M ′′η∗)/E{c(r,N)}(γ1 − σ2).
V. CONCLUSIONS
Adding input and output noises for increasing the model
identification error was considered. Optimal filters for con-
structing additive coloured noises were designed to maxi-
mize the identification error while maintaining the closed-
performance degradation below a threshold. Differential pri-
vacy was also explored for designing output noises that
preserve the privacy of the model.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2.7
We have tr(Ph) = tr((R
⊤R)−1R⊤(LL⊤ +
σ2IN )R(R
⊤R)−1) = tr(L⊤EL) + c Now, note that
tr(L⊤EL) = vec(L)⊤ vec(EL) = vec(L)⊤(IN+nl−1 ⊗
E) vec(L) = l⊤Q⊤l (IN+nl−1 ⊗ E)Qll, where the second
step follows from [12, Lemma 4.3.1].
B. Proof of Theorem 2.9
Taking the derivative of the cost function with re-
spect to l results in ∂/∂l
[
(l⊤Ml + c)−1 + γ2‖l‖2
]
=
−2Ml/(l⊤Ml + c)2 + γ2l. Setting this derivative equal to
zero gives
(
M − γ2(l⊤Ml + c)2Inl
)
l = 0. The candidate
solutions for this equation are either l = 0 (referred to as the
type-1 solution) or vectors l that are parallel to vi with the
condition that ‖l‖2 = 1/√γλi − c/λi for all i = 1, . . . , nl
(referred to as the type-2 solutions). An eigenvalue λi may
generate a type-2 solution only if λi ≥ γ2c2 (since otherwise
l would have a negative norm, which is not possible).
Therefore, if λ1 < γ2c
2, the only solution to (18) can be
the type-1 solution l = 0 (as the condition λi ≥ γ2c2 cannot
be satisfied for any i if it cannot be satisfied for the largest
eigenvalue λ1). This is the case if the penalty on the variance
of y is too large and no variations can be tolerated.
If λi = γ2c
2, the two types of solution coincide.
We now verify whether type-1 and type-2 solutions corre-
spond to global minima of the cost function in (18). Let us
define k := (l⊤Ml+ c), and also denote the i-th row of M
by m⊤i . Computing the Hessian of the cost function in (18)
at l yields J(l) = − 2k2M + 8k3 V (l) + 2γ2Inl , where V (l)
is a matrix such that its entry (h, k) is Vhk(l) = l
⊤mhm
⊤
k l.
Then J(0) = − 2c2M+2γ2Inl , which is positive definite only
if λ1 < γ2c
2. This observation shows that the type-1 solution
l = 0 is only a minimum when λ1 < γ2c
2. Noting that for
the case where λ1 < γ2c
2, l = 0 is the only stationary point
of the cost function, then it is a global minimum.
We now study type-2 solutions. Let us define α2i :=
1/
√
γ2λi − c/λi, so that a candidate type-2 solution can
be written l∗ = αivi, i = 1, . . . , nl. In what follows,
we first assume that λ1 > λ2 ≥ λi. We then relax this
assumption at the end of the proof. For any k = 1, . . . , nl,
we have m⊤k l
∗ = m⊤k αivi = λiαivi,k, where vi,k is the
k-th entry of vi. Consequently Vhk(l
∗) = l∗Tmhm
⊤
k l
∗ =
λ2iα
2
i vi,hvi,k, and, in matrix notation, V (l
∗) = λ2iα
2
i viv
⊤
i .
Hence, for any of these solutions, we have J(l∗) =
−2/(α2iλi + c)2M + (8α2i λ2i )/(α2iλi + c)3viv⊤i + 2γ2Inl =
−2γ2/λiM+8γ2viv⊤i −c
√
γ32/
√
λiviv
⊤
i +2γ2Inl . SinceM
is positive semidefinite, its eigenvectors form an orthonormal
basis [12, p. 229]. Hence, M admits the decomposition
M =
∑nl
j=1 λjvjv
⊤
j . Consequently, we can write J(l
∗) =
∑nl
j=1 ηjvjv
⊤
j + 2γ2Inl , where
ηj =
{ −2γ2λj/λi j 6= i
−2γ2λj/λi + 8γ2 − c
√
γ32/
√
λi j = i .
Due to the orthonormality of the vj , the eigenvalues of J(l
∗)
are then ηj + 2γ2, j = 1, . . . , nl.
Consider now a candidate type-2 solution corresponding to
an eigenvalue λi, i ≥ 2. In this case, one of the eigenvalues
of J(l∗) is 2γ2 (1− λ1/λi), which is negative under the
assumption λ1 > λ2 ≥ λi. Therefore, all the candidate type-
2 solution corresponding to an eigenvalue λi, i ≥ 2, are not
minimums so we must discard them. As for λ1, the set of
eigenvalues ρj of J(l
∗) are
ρj = 2γ2 (1− λj/λ1)+
{
8γ2(1 − c
√
γ2/λ1), if j = 1,
0, otherwise
which are all positive for λ1 > c
2γ2. Therefore, J(l
∗) is
positive definite for l∗ =
√
1/
√
γ2λ1 − c/λ1v1 and, since
there are no other minimums, this corresponds to a global
minimum.
Now, assume that λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λj > λj−1. Following
the same steps as the proof above, we can show that none
of the type-2 solutions corresponding to λi with j − 1 ≤
i ≤ nl can be a minimizer (because the Hessian is indefinite
for them). Similarly, we can also show that all the type-2
solutions corresponding to λi with 1 ≤ i ≤ j are at least
local minimums (because the Hessian is positive definite).
To show that these points are also a global minimizer, we
need to prove that they have the same cost. Let l∗i1 =√
1/
√
γ2λi1 − c/λi1vi1 and l∗i2 =
√
1/
√
γ2λi2 − c/λi2vi2
for any 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ j. We have (l∗i1⊤Ml∗i1 + c)−1 +
γ2‖l∗i1‖2 = (λi1 + c)−1 + γ2(1/
√
γ2λi1 − c/λi1) = (λi2 +
c)−1+γ2(1/
√
γ2λi2−c/λi2) = (l∗i2⊤Ml∗i2+c)−1+γ2‖l∗i2‖2,
where the first equality follows from that λi1 = λi2 .
C. Proof of Theorem 3.2
It can be proved that
P{y ∈ Y|h, e}
=
(
1
2b
)N∫
RN
χ(Rh+ w + e ∈ Y) exp(−‖w‖1/b)dw
=
(
1
2b
)N∫
RN
χ(u ∈ Y) exp(−‖u−Rh− e‖1/b)du
≤ exp(‖Rh′ −Rh‖1/b)
×
(
1
2b
)N∫
RN
χ(u ∈ Y) exp(−‖u−Rh′ − e‖1/b)du
=exp(‖Rh′−Rh‖1/b)P{y∈Y|h′, e}, (29)
where χ(·) is a characteristic function, i.e., χ(y ∈ Y) = 1
if y ∈ Y and χ(y ∈ Y) = 0 if y /∈ Y , and the inequality
follows from ‖u − Rh′ − e‖1 = ‖u − Rh′ − e − Rh +
Rh‖1 ≤ ‖u − Rh − e‖1 + ‖Rh′ − Rh‖1. Integrating (29)
over e gives P{y ∈ Y|h} ≤ exp(‖Rh′ − Rh‖1/b)P{y ∈
Y|h′} = exp(ǫ)P{y ∈ Y|h′}.
D. Proof of Proposition 3.4
If h, h′ only differ in entry j, ‖Rh − Rh′‖1 = |hj −
h′j |
∑N−j
k=1 |rk|, 1 ≤ j ≤ nh. Thus, suph≤hj ,h′j≤h ‖Rh −
Rh′‖1 = (h−h)
∑N−j
k=1 |rk|. The rest of the proof follows
from that all the terms in the sum are positive (and setting
j = 1 keeps the most terms).
